Can There Be a Nonconsequentialist Rights-Based Moral Justification of Terrorism?

According to some philosophers, acts of terrorism are necessarily morally wrong because such acts violate fundamental human rights. Virginia Held (1991) challenges this common view. She focuses on situations in which serious rights violations are already occurring, and considers the moral justifiability of the use of terrorism in pursuit of a more just society. Whether she succeeds in offering a non consequentialist rights-based justification of terrorism, however, is a vexed question. My contention is that Held is correct that a non consequentialist rights-based justification of some acts of terrorism is possible, but that her discussion of the conditions that must be satisfied for this to be the case is incomplete. I examine Held’s argument along with some of the objections that have been leveled against it, respond to these objections, and then articulate the conditions under which acts of terrorism may be morally justified from a non consequentialist rights-based perspective. Whether any acts of terrorism do, or are likely to, satisfy these conditions is a distinct question not addressed here.