TY - JOUR
T1 - Character, Reliability, and Virtue Epistemology
AU - Baehr, Jason
N1 - Baehr, Jason. “Character, Reliability, and Virtue Epistemology.” Philosophical Quarterly 56 (2006): 193-212.
PY - 2006
Y1 - 2006
N2 - Standard characterizations of virtue epistemology divide the field into two camps: virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. Virtue reliabilists think of intellectual virtues as reliable cognitive faculties or abilities, while virtue responsibilists conceive of them as good intellectual character traits. I argue that responsibilist character virtues sometimes satisfy the conditions of a reliabilist conception of intellectual virtue, and that consequently virtue reliabilists, and reliabilists in general, must pay closer attention to matters of intellectual character. This leads to several new questions and challenges for any reliabilist epistemology.
AB - Standard characterizations of virtue epistemology divide the field into two camps: virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. Virtue reliabilists think of intellectual virtues as reliable cognitive faculties or abilities, while virtue responsibilists conceive of them as good intellectual character traits. I argue that responsibilist character virtues sometimes satisfy the conditions of a reliabilist conception of intellectual virtue, and that consequently virtue reliabilists, and reliabilists in general, must pay closer attention to matters of intellectual character. This leads to several new questions and challenges for any reliabilist epistemology.
UR - https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/phil_fac/35
M3 - Article
SN - 1467-9213
VL - 56
SP - 193
EP - 212
JO - Philosophical Quarterly
JF - Philosophical Quarterly
ER -