Korsgaard on the foundations of moral obligation

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Abstract

In 'The Sources of Normativity', Christine Korsgaard argues, a la Kant, that we must value the humanity of others ultimately because we must value our own humanity. I examine her argument for the claim that we must value our own humanity. I argue that the sense in which this is so fails to generate a sufficiently robust account of moral obligation and that Korsgaard therefore fails to explain the foundations of normativity
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)481-491
Number of pages11
JournalJournal of Value Inquiry
Volume37
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - 2003
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus Subject Areas

  • Philosophy
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Law

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