"Necessary" and "Possible" as Metaphysical Preambles: A Defense of Avicenna Against Averroes

When considering the metaphysical preambles to faith, the existence of God is surely preeminent. While investigation of preambles is often a feature of the generally Christian and particularly Catholic entrée to theology, they also concern the other Abrahamic religions. The present study explores “necessary” and “possible” as metaphysical preambles in the thought of Avicenna. Though compelling, Avicenna’s account has not escaped criticism, most notably from Averroes, who rejected both these concepts and Avicenna’s subsequent argument for God, the Necessary Existent. Rejecting “necessary” and “possible” as metaphysical preambles can have far-reaching consequences, not only for the cogency of Avicennian metaphysics, but for any natural theology that seeks to employ these concepts. The present study, first, defends “necessary” and “possible” as formulated in the metaphysics of Avicenna. Second, it shows how these concepts serve as preambles to arguments for God. Third, it addresses and refutes Averroes’ criticisms.