´Nunca se han apiñado tantos pensamientos profundos en tan pocas hojas...’. La intuición intelectual en Schelling y el §76 de la Crítica del Juicio

Schelling’s affirmation of the possibility of intellectual intuition is read by many as indicating the return to pre-Kantian forms of metaphysics. This presents a problem within German idealism scholarship. In light of this problem, in this paper I argue for the importance of paragraph 76 of Kant’s Critique of Judgement on Schelling’s application of the notion of intellectual intuition. According to the argument I defend, this paragraph of the Critique of Judgement remains key for understanding how Schelling comprehends the compatibility between remaining true to Kantian philosophy while mobilizing the resource of intellectual intuition forbidden by Kant’s limitations on human cognition. I furthermore argue for a reading of the paragraph as involving a ‘modal collapse’, which in turn allows us to understand Schelling’s late philosophy as a return to Kant.